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Do pension participants want the freedom to choose or the freedom to 
snooze?  
 
By Hendrik P. van Dalen and Kène Henkens 
March 2, 2018 
 
Individual freedom of choice is a much heralded and cherished principle in democracies. Milton 
Friedman and colleagues at his alma mater, the University of Chicago, made this a cornerstone 
of their belief (Friedman & Friedman, 1990). The freedom of choice is the antidote to excessive 
government interference and an instrument which enables people to realize their goals and 
discipline agents and organizations. The call for freedom is getting louder as individualization of 
every life is becoming more and more visible and trust in institutions is eroding. Numerous 
sociologists of name and fame (Beck, 2002; Putnam, 2001) have documented this trend and 
predicted its dire consequences. Policy makers have translated this trend into privatizing tasks 
and services which were financed or provided on a collective scale. Of course, the question 
remains: do people really want to take the fate of their lives in their own hands? For simple 
products and services freedom can be safely entrusted to individuals, but for complex services 
with long lasting consequences freedom of choice may not be in the interest of citizens at all. 
This question will probably be at the forefront in debates about many reforms in social security, 
health care, pensions as governments are shifting risks from collective levels to the level of the 
individual. 
 
One particular debate in which the freedom of choice is clearly visible concerns the current 
reforms of pension systems (Whiteford & Whitehouse, 2006). Governments are considering 
more options for pension participants to make choices to suit their preferences. Indeed, the UK 
government has made this explicit in allowing people with defined contribution pension 
arrangements, as of April 2015, the freedom to take up their savings from the age of 55. The 
combination of free choice, competition and regulation is in the UK government’s view serving 
the interest of consumers (see (Treasury, 2014)). However, experience has shown that by and 
large most people do not take charge of their pension wealth (Tapia &Yermo, 2007). E.g., the 
percentage of participants who fit the mold of active chooser with respect to investing their 
pension savings (see Figure 1) is small: from barely 1 percent in Peru to 20 percent in the UK. 
Faced with a choice, most people are led by defaults or when defaults do not exist, they do 









Figure 1: Percentage of pension participants making active choices with respect to pension 
investments within pension system allowing choice 
 
 
Sources country data: Agnew, Balduzzi, &Sunden, 2003; Byrne, 2007; Chetty, Friedman, Leth-
Petersen, Nielsen, & Olsen, 2014; Fuentes, Searle, &Villatoro, 2013; IOPS, 2012; Rozinka& Tapia, 
2007; Tapia &Yermo, 2007. 
 
Of course, economists with a critical bent of mind (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, &Metrick, 2002; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Orszag & Stiglitz, 2001) are well aware that increasing choice is 
fraught with pitfalls. As the pension expert Barr (2002) stated years ago about pension reforms: 
“the possibility that increased choice is welfare improving is a myth” (p. 13).  
 
Two concepts of freedom 
The key to understanding the difficulties in giving consumers sovereignty in pension affairs can 
be found in philosophy. Worldly philosophers have pointed out that freedom is not a one-
dimensional concept. Both Berlin (1958) and Sen (1988) have brought to the fore that freedom 
can be of two sorts: positive freedom, referring to the desire to take control of one’s own life and 
exercise choice to attain own goals, and negative freedom, referring to the absence of force or 
constraints imposed by others. Economists like Friedman are often tacitly ascribing to the 
concept of freedom as being of a positive kind, whereas citizens may be thinking about the 
negative freedom concept and refrain from making choices. 
 
To disentangle the two concepts is virtually impossible by examining actual behavior, but by 
properly designing a survey one may be able to shed some light on the actual desire of people 
wanting positive freedom in the domain of pensions. The present article focuses on the case of 























The Dutch government is the process of reforming its pension system to adapt to changing age 
structure, changing labor market. For years the Dutch pension system has been seen and 
evaluated by peers for years as a system that belongs to the top-3 of the world (Mercer, 2015). 
Especially the supplementary pension system is praised. It is traditionally organized and governed 
by collective pension funds offering pensions guaranteeing a relatively high benefit. Risk of 
poverty among old aged in the Netherlands is the lowest in the world. Every employee is on a 
mandatory basis connected to the pension fund of the employer.  
In planning for reform governments are also keen to cater to the needs of a society which calls 
for individualization. In 2014 the Dutch government initiated a poll among the general public 
about the future of pensions in which 60 percent of the Dutch wanted to choose their own 
investment portfolio, 58 percent wanted to choose the level of their pension savings, and 45 
percent wanted to choose their own pension fund.  Of course, these figures need to be treated 
with caution. Asking individuals to value the freedom to choose is bound to trigger associations 
which are undoubtedly positive.  
 
It is of crucial importance to get a more refined insight in the degree of desired choice. To this 
end we designed a survey asking Dutch employees about the importance they attach to freedom 
of choice within their collective pension arrangement, as well as the importance of delegating 
choices to the board of their pension fund (see supplement for details). Of course, so-called carry-
over effects (De Leeuw, Hox, &Dillman, 2008) will be present in one single survey in case you ask 
respondents both the freedom of choice option and the option of delegating choice. Therefore, 
we split the total sample of pension participants into two randomly selected samples (A and B). 
Sample A received the question to evaluate the possibility of freedom of choice for a set of 
pension issues which are key for the buildup of pension wealth.  For five elements of the 
collective pension contract we asked employees to judge the importance of having freedom of 
choice or the freedom from making a choice for : (1) the level of pension savings; (2) having the 
option to choose your own pension fund; (3)pension package - the number of risks covered by 
the pension contract (think of the level of old age pension income, invalidity pension, or a pension 
for your partner); and (4) the risk composition of investments.  
 
The other group (sample B) was asked to evaluate the importance of letting all pension choices 
be determined by their pension fund. A half year later the follow-up survey was carried out in 
which the questions were switched for both groups. So, in the end, every individual 
independently judged the value of freedom of choice and the value of delegating choice. By using 
both independently measured preferences for choice and delegation of choice per respondent 
one is able to offer a more refined picture of choice preferences (see van Dalen and Henkens 
(2018) for full report): who is indifferent, who values delegation of choice, who values individual 
freedom of choice, and who values both delegation and free choice. The latter two categories 
enable us to unravel the two concepts of freedom Isiah Berlin was after. We identify supporters 
of positive freedom as those who consistently value freedom of choice higher than delegation of 
choice. And we define supporters of negative freedom as those who value both the freedom of 
 
 
choice and the delegation of choice. Based on this categorization one can construct the 
preference ordering as depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Accounting for freedom (percentage of those who value freedom of choice in pension 
matters, by negative and positive freedom) 
 
 
Negative freedom = people who favor both freedom and delegation of choice 
Positive freedom = people who consistently favor freedom of choice over delegation of choice 
Source: based on Van Dalen and Henkens (2018) 
 
 
Three conclusions stand out. First, the percentage of participants who value positive freedom of 
choice varies from 14 to 26 percent. This is not a negligible number but certainly not the majority 
which must be in the back of the minds of policy makers when they introduce freedom of choice 
in pensions. Second, for the case of pension investment, the derived percentage of active 
choosers – 18 percent – falls well within the actual numbers as depicted in Figure 1. More so, 
when one realizes that a considerable number of people may overestimate their desire to make 
choices. Third, when we take a look at the valuation of negative freedom - as defined by our 
measures - it appears that for three of the four domains of pension finance negative freedom is 
the dominant view on freedom and for the remaining domain – pension fund choice– the 








































Reforming pensions is a brain buster for governments now populations are aging and economic 
growth stagnates. The consensus view among policy makers is that credible pension plans can 
only be attained by shifting risks to citizens and lowering benefits. And this plan fits well with the 
view that societies are becoming more individualized. Granting individual freedom is a natural 
step to take. Let citizens decide. In making these judgements policy makers are sometimes 
informed by surveys and sometimes by the way they view the world. Both sources have their 
shortcomings. Economic reforms are often tacitly based on the idea that the one-dimensional 
idea that freedom is instrumentally important, whereas citizens may value freedom on its 
intrinsic merits.  This view is reinforced by surveys which also take this same view. The reality is 
that people attach importance to both the freedom of choice as well as the freedom from making 
a choice. It is only by taking both concepts into account that one may come closer to the truth 
what people really appreciate. For the case of pensions only a minority seeks the ideal of having 
complete control over the decisions which help to attain one’s goals in life. The history of 
pensions shows that people are financially illiterate, myopic, badly prepared for retirement and 
when they are offered choices they by and large refrain from making them (Tapia &Yermo, 2007). 
These problems were the very reason for establishing collective pension funds. Introducing or 
enlarging freedom of choice will certainly not solve these same problems. 
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